# NERC

# **EV Chargers**

Draft findings of Grid Impact

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# Background

- This work builds off past LMWG presentations by Joe Eto
- DOE, NERC, GE, and EPRI coordination in for beta model

DOE Transmission Reliability R&D Program

Distribution-Level Impacts of Plug-in Electric Vehicle Charging on the Transmission System during Fault Conditions

> NERC Load Modeling Working Group October 28, 2021

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# Background







#### Electric Vehicle Dynamic Charging Performance Characteristics during Bulk Power System Disturbances

#### Synopsis

The purpose of this document is to highlight the need for collaboration between electric utilities and the electric vehicle (EV)/electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) manufacturing industry to develop strategies that will help ensure bulk power system (BPS) reliability, resilience, and security.<sup>1</sup> This document focuses on an area that is relatively unexplored: EV charging behavior during infrequent grid disturbances that originate from the BPS. These events last no more than a few seconds but may have catastrophic consequences for grid reliability if left unchecked (i.e., cascading blackouts and widespread power interruptions). This document outlines the need for early engagement and information exchange between the electric utilities and the EV/EVSE manufacturing industry to facilitate anticipation and timely resolution of potential grid reliability issues. Toward this end, this document describes the BPS-related reliability concerns that electric utilities are studying in anticipation of the expected significant increase in EV charging loads. This document then outlines the electric utility's current recommendations to mitigate these concerns based on preliminary observations, including changing EV charger and EVSE operation during these infrequent, short-duration events. This document concludes by outlining a solution to meet the need for on-going information sharing between the two communities. This includes the need for future studies to refine these recommendations to become accepted industry practices and standards. This coordination will foster mutual understanding of the issues that must be addressed on both sides of the meter to ensure grid reliability, resilience, and security at the least cost to society as electrification of the transportation fleet grows.

 Recommends steadystate control of Constant I over Constant P

- Droop control of 5%
- Operate in "gridfriendly manner"
  - Continuous Operation
  - Grid Disturbances
  - Severe Grid Conditions (e.g., blackouts)

https://www.nerc.com/comm/R STC/Documents/Grid\_Friendly\_E V\_Charging\_Recommendations. pdf RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY



## Grid Friendly and Grid Unfriendly Behavior







Of all 6 types of EV chargers, 4 broad behaviors:

- 1) Trip for long period of time and recover slow
- 2) Trip for short period of time and recover quickly
- 3) Ride-through fault, trip post-fault, and recovery slowly
- 4) Ride-through fault with minor disruption



# **4 Broad Behavior Implemented in Beta EV Model**



Taken from Beta GE software implementation. Subject to change **RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY** 







# **NERC Study work**

- Chose two cases to test the model on
  - Heavy Summer High loading and stressed conditions
  - Light Spring for lower flows and voltage stability
- Adjusted cases potentially to allow for:
  - Increase of load and generation to require 100 GW of EV penetration
  - Generation composition
  - Area flow changes to account for Area EV composition being different
- Recovery types studied have the following parameters:
  - Constant P
  - Constant I
  - Fast Recovery Long Ramp = ¼ sec delay and 10 second ramp to pre-dist level
  - Fast Recovery Fast Ramp = ¼ sec delay and 1 second ramp to pre-dist level
  - No Delay Fast Ramp = 0 sec delay and 1 second ramp to pre-dist level
  - Long Recovery = 10 sec delay and 10 sec ramp to pre-dist level



- Cases had between 10 and 20% EV penetration
  - Other load is broken down via 3 phase motors, 1 phase motors, static load, etc.
- Studied two types of faults
  - Fault one 10 cycle 3-phase bus fault on 500 kV substation
  - Fault two 4 cycle 3-phase bus fault on 500kV substation near known FIDVR conditions exist

Study Case Comparison				
Case name	Case Description	Total Load	Total EV Load	EV Percentage of Load
33HS1a1_EV	NERC modified 2033 Heavy Summer	193,120 MW	37,748 MW	19.55%
24LSP2Sa1_EV	NERC modified 2024 Light Spring	154,775 MW	19,941 MW	12.88%

Adjusted cases nearing 50% plus EV penetration – In progress



- Plots and charts are different for each fault
- Fault one plots and charts show the largest moved EV model to the fault in heavy summer conditions.
  - Interconnection-wide parameters use the aggregate of these responses.
  - Electrically relatively far. (5 buses, 2 transformers)
- Fault two plots the load at the 115 kV yard where the 500 kV bus is applied.
  - Electrically close to the fault (1 bus away through a transformer)



# **EV Power Recovery – Heavy Summer**





### High Side Voltage Recovery – Heavy Summer



# Ride-through in Const I or Const P preferred!



# **EV Power Recovery – Light Spring**





# High Side Voltage Recovery – Light Spring



### Ride-through in Const I or Const P preferred!

OV condition disturbance if regardless of ramp speed



# **EV Power Recovery – FIDVR** Sensitivity









# **High Side Voltage Recovery – Zoomed**

in



Longer time recovery better\*

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- At a broad level, the implemented aggregate EV model is robust and can represent the aggregate charging equipment
  - Not shown is fractional recovery/cessation capability to have some ridethrough in const I and others cease. This is a current capability
- EV charging equipment should either:
  - Ride-through in Constant I or Constant P for fault.
  - Cease charging only when necessary and recover with no intentional time delay and ramp to pre-disturbance set points within 1 second.
  - This confirms the CMC report findings
- FIDVR conditions are not as likely as other grid disturbances, so the longer delays, broadly speaking, aren't grid friendly
  - In areas where FIDVR is still a concern, TPs should require EV chargers to add delay to their recovery.



### **Resource Loss Testing**

- Model assumptions:
  - Outside of all ConsI, modeled load as ConstP with current limits
  - When modeling primary frequency response
    - $\circ$  5% droop
    - 17mHz deadband



# **Median frequency**



### Const P and No Delay overlap



# **Interconnection-wide load**





### **EV model Output**





# **High Side Transformer Voltage**



5% droop > noEV = constl > constP



- Adding more constant power load to the system reduces the small signal stability and frequency response performance.
  - Not just an EV finding. EVs should operate in Constant Current over Constant Power. This confirms the CMC report findings
- Adding a 5% droop response to load significantly improves small signal stability as well as arresting the frequency decline. This confirms the CMC report findings
  - Sharing the reduction of charging across all models reduces load by ~400 MW, but individual record reduced 3 MW.
- EV chargers should implement a droop characteristic of no lesser than 5% and a reasonable deadband (*17mHz*)
  - May be altered depending on droop sensitivity study
  - Deadband can be altered based on Interconnection



### **Future Work**



- Resource loss performance In progress
- Droop control sensitivities In progress
- Frequency response sensitivities In progress
- Detection delay sensitivity in progress
- Addition of "no-EV" baselines Complete

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- Large scale versus small scale EV deployment
- Additional FIDVR sensitivities
- Angular stability sensitivity
- Low Inertia/weak grid cases



# **Questions and Answers**



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